Nguyen Phu Trong’s Incomplete Legacy in Vietnam

The steadfast leadership of Vietnam’s General Secretary has ironically created a potential leadership vacuum, as succession planning has not been one of his strong suits, unlike anti-corruption and other stellar achievements.

On 18 July 2024, the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) announced that General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong would take a break from his duties to focus on receiving active medical treatment. President To Lam will step in to temporarily assume his responsibilities. On the same day, Trong was awarded the Gold Star Order – Vietnam’s highest honour – in recognition of his contributions to the Party and the nation. This announcement has raised concerns about Trong’s declining health and the possibility of his imminent passing. These speculations have been fuelled by his frail appearance during a recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Trong’s absence from important political meetings. While the latest announcement was not entirely unexpected, it holds significant implications for the political future of Vietnam.

Trong’s tenure has represented one of the most exciting periods in Vietnamese politics. With his prior experience as Hanoi’s Party secretary and chairman of the National Assembly, he was chosen as a compromise candidate for the general secretary position in 2011. This role had been weakened during his predecessor’s two terms, Nong Duc Manh, as power in Vietnam’s political system shifted towards the government wing led by then Prime Minister (PM) Nguyen Tan Dung. Beneath his grandfatherly appearance, Trong proved to be a determined and skilled politician. In a tense power struggle at the 12th CPV national congress in 2016, he successfully ousted Dung and served a second term. Following the unexpected passing of President Tran Dai Quang in 2018, Trong concurrently held the role of state president until April 2021. Despite stepping down from the presidency, he continued as CPV general secretary for an unprecedented third term, reportedly because the Party could not reach a consensus on his successor.

Trong is best known for launching a high-profile anti-corruption campaign that targeted government officials of all ranks. Since 2016, over 139,000 party members have been disciplined, including 40 members of the CPV Central Committee and 50 generals in the military and police forces. Notably, eight Politburo members, including former presidents Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo Van Thuong, former National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, and Permanent Member of the CPV Secretariat Truong Thi Mai, have been removed from their positions. To put this into perspective, between 1986 and 2016, no Politburo members were ousted for corruption and only nine members of the Central Committee were disciplined for corruption-related offences.

As the CPV’s top leader, Trong’s main job is to maintain the Party’s survival and ultimately its hold on power. As such, he often adopted a hardline approach towards perceived threats to regime security. Under Trong’s watch, internal affairs institutions like the Ministry of Public Security and the CPV Central Inspection Commission were strengthened to combat corruption. There was also an emphasis on revitalising ideology as a means of preventing moral decay among party members. These actions led to a widespread crackdown on corruption and the tightening of Vietnam’s public sphere.

Now, Vietnam could potentially face a succession crisis.

However, Trong’s approach to governance primarily focused on party affairs, leaving the country’s economic and foreign policies relatively free from ideological constraints. Throughout his tenure, Vietnam has continued its economic reforms and maintained an open approach towards trade and investment. Despite initial concerns that as a Soviet-trained ideologue, Trong would steer Vietnam towards China and Russia at the expense of its relationships with Western countries, he instead oversaw Hanoi’s deepened engagements with these partners. This is most evident in the elevation of Vietnam’s ties with the US to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2023, as well as his historic visit to the White House in 2015, the first by a CPV general secretary.

Trong’s unwavering dedication to party-building has led to noteworthy institutional transformations within Vietnam’s one-party system. For instance, he spearheaded Decision 244 that institutionalises party elections and introduced key regulations on the criteria and confidence voting process for high-level officials. Under his guidance, the CPV conducted experimental direct elections at the grassroots level. Trong hoped to build a strong institutional foundation to maintain the CPV’s resilience.

Yet, Trong’s consolidation of power during his anti-corruption crusade had the unexpected consequence of undermining the very institutions he sought to strengthen. His dominance led to the centralisation of decision-making power within the Politburo and himself, thereby weakening the Central Committee and undermining the principle of collective leadership. Such problems were manageable as long as he remained in power as a benevolent leader and a unifying force. In his absence, maintaining such a system may prove challenging for any replacement.

Now, Vietnam could potentially face a succession crisis. Trong’s unparalleled authority, derived from his clean reputation, seniority and long stewardship, creates a void that would be difficult to fill. If he were to pass away before the end of his term, any succession plans he may have had for the 2026 Party Congress would go unrealised. The Politburo would then have to select a successor from among themselves. As announced by the Party, President To Lam has effectively become the interim general secretary, given his position as the CPV’s second-highest ranking member. However, this raises several challenging questions for the party’s future.

First, the Politburo must decide whether to elect a new general secretary or continue with the interim appointee until the next Party congress in 2026. If a new general secretary is to be elected, the top three leaders under Trong – President To Lam, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, and Permanent Member of the CPV Secretariat Luong Cuong – may emerge as the main contenders. Second, if To Lam is elected as the new general secretary, should he retain his presidency and effectively unify the two positions, as is done in China, or should the “four pillar” leadership mechanism (meaning the general secretary, president, PM and National Assembly chair positions) be maintained? Third, will the political elites rally around the new leader or will infighting continue to intensify until 2026?

An uncertain succession is arguably the greatest lapse of Trong’s otherwise remarkable tenure. His legacies, most notably the anti-corruption campaign, will greatly depend on his successor’s approach. However, irrespective of who succeeds Trong, major changes to Vietnam’s economic and foreign policy should not be expected. Ultimately, preserving the Party’s rule will be the new leader’s main priority, much like it was for Trong. The next leader will have much to glean from Trong’s successful strategies, which have substantially contributed to Vietnam’s rise and the CPV’s political legitimacy.

By Le Hong Hiep & Nguyen Khac Giang – Fulcrum.sg / Yusof Ishak Institute – July 19, 2024