Vietnam-Ukraine ties : more engagement, more balanced approach ? 

Vietnam, traditionally seen to be more allied with Russia, has recently increased its diplomatic engagements with Ukraine. This could result in Vietnam taking a more neutral stance in the Russia-Ukraine war.

On 17 February 2025, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bui Thanh Son and Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrii Sybiha spoke over the phone. This marked the third exchange between Vietnamese and Ukrainian officials in the past six months, compared to the same number of meetings over the previous two and a half years. The increased engagement from both sides reflects Vietnam’s more balanced approach in the Russia-Ukraine war, as Hanoi traditionally has had more active ties with Russia.

According to local media reports, Son reiterated Vietnam’s neutral stance on the conflict during the conversation, and emphasised that all disputes should be resolved peacefully in accordance with international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter. At the same time, he said Vietnam supported international mediation efforts to find a lasting peaceful solution for all.

This conversation occurred a month after Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where Chinh reiterated Vietnam’s stance on the conflict. Previously,  the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary To Lam, then-president of Vietnam, met President Zelenskyy at the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2024, where he affirmed Vietnam’s support for mediation efforts to resolve the conflict with the involvement of all relevant parties.

This meeting marked the highest-level engagement between the two nations since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war. Also present were the head of the CPV Central Commission for External Affairs, Le Hoai Trung, and Foreign Minister Son.

This was also a significant step forward from the brief interaction between President Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Chinh at the G7 meeting in Tokyo, Japan, in May 2023. In November 2022, Son also met with the then-foreign minister of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Before that, on 17 March 2022, nearly a month after the start of the war in Ukraine, Son had a phone call with Kuleba. This call came relatively late, considering that many countries had expressed support for Ukraine earlier. During the conversation, Vietnam refrained from committing any aid to Ukraine, instead urging restraint and the pursuit of dialogue to seek a long-term solution.

Vietnam’s friendship with both Russia and Ukraine is decades-long, founded on the crucial economic, military, and diplomatic support given by the then-Soviet Union to Vietnam in the 1950s. But to many Vietnamese, the conflict is seen as a proxy war between the West and Russia. They tend to support Russia and blame the Ukrainian government for aligning with the West to weaken Russia.

Local authorities have obstructed the Ukrainian embassy from organising certain activities — for example, the Ukrainian ambassador’s wife organised a poetry-reading event but the electricity was cut. An exhibition of Ukrainian achievements was cancelled at the last minute because no permit had been given. A local restaurant owner also cancelled a farewell meal for a Ukrainian diplomat. These events led to widespread discussion on social media among pro-Ukrainian Vietnamese.

By the end of 2024, the Ukrainian government implemented reciprocal measures to restrict the Vietnamese embassy in Kyiv from organising activities like a Vietnam-Ukraine concert on the occasion of Vietnam’s 79th independence anniversary. The ban was lifted only after Vietnam agreed to exchange diplomatic delegations with Ukraine.

To many Vietnamese, the conflict is seen as a proxy war between the West and Russia. They tend to support Russia and blame the Ukrainian government for aligning with the West to weaken Russia.

Despite increased communications, the meetings have yet to yield significant outcomes — for example, a Vietnamese offer to participate in post-war reconstruction or the clearing of minefields. Vietnamese media highlighted that the phone call between Son and Sybiha was initiated at Ukraine’s request. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website has a brief statement from Sybiha saying his conversation with Son focused on enhancing bilateral relations and international support for a comprehensive peace.

Following the conversation between the two ministers, there has been speculation in Vietnamese media and social media platforms about Prime Minister Chinh’s alleged offer to use Vietnam as a venue for Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations. A Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson neither confirmed nor denied this information. VietnamNet, a major local news portal, suggested that as a responsible member of the international community, Vietnam hosted the second US-North Korea summit in 2019 and is now, therefore, ready to provide a venue for peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.

However, the likelihood of Vietnam hosting peace talks between the two warring nations is extremely low. Vietnam was more suitable for talks between the US and North Korea because the North Korean nuclear issue is a concern in East Asia, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un rarely travels by air. Moreover, Vietnam served as a model for transitioning from an adversary to a partner of the US after the Vietnam War, and the US had hoped North Korea would emulate it.

In contrast, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is happening on another continent, and both countries have more meeting venue options than the US and North Korea.

Although Vietnam’s potential role as a peace broker in the Russia-Ukraine war may not materialise, the increased exchange with Ukraine demonstrates its now more balanced approach. Being pro-Russia can sometimes be seen as pro-aggressor but with more engagement with Ukraine, Vietnam’s image in the international arena would be greatly improved. Ultimately, this will enhance its strategic and diplomatic position.

By Nguyen Hong Thach – Fulcrum.sg / ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute – March 6, 2025