What is Vietnam’s administrative ‘revolution’ ?

These administrative reforms are set to slash government spending, including rooting out some prestigious and comfortable government jobs. But is it just another way to consolidate power ?

Vietnam is undergoing what officials call an administrative « revolution, » part of a broader campaign to modernize the state, jumpstart economic growth, and consolidate political power in the hands of the Communist Party’s upper ranks.

To Lam, the country’s new party chief, is spearheading the reforms. Lam took the helm following the death of Nguyen Phu Trong last year. Of the reforms, Lam said, « If we want to have a healthy body, sometimes we must take bitter medicine and endure pain to remove tumors. »

At the heart of this transformation is a sweeping plan to trim bureaucracy and reorganize the state. In March, Hanoi began merging five cabinet ministries and three national-level agencies. Simultaneously, dozens of state-run media outlets and radio stations were shuttered or merged. Even the Communist Party’s own commissions and internal departments are being slimmed down.

This « revolution » is expected to eliminate around 100,000 public sector jobs — roughly 15% of the one-party communist state’s entire bureaucracy. Officials say the cuts will make the state more agile and redirect public resources toward economic growth, with the goal of attaining high-income status by 2045.

A two-tier system, from state to party level

Changes to Vietnam’s administrative map are allowing for these cuts. In April, the government approved a plan to reduce the number of provinces and municipalities from 63 to 34 through mergers. District-level governance will be abolished, leaving only two layers of local government: the provinces and the commune-level administrations. This two-tier system will be replicated within the Communist Party, the military, and the judiciary.

« After nearly four decades, Vietnam’s original Doi Moi reforms have run their course, » said Khac Giang Nguyen, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, referring to the economic liberalization program launched in the 1980s. « Growth is slowing, productivity gains are stalling, and the old model of cheap labor and foreign capital no longer guarantees success. »

The shake-up is also intended to address dysfunction created by the Party’s own anti-corruption campaign. Under former leader Trong, Vietnam launched an aggressive graft-busting initiative in 2016 that toppled two presidents, numerous cabinet ministers, and thousands of lower-level officials. To Lam, who served as public security minister at the time, was the campaign’s chief enforcer.

While popular with the public, the anti-corruption drive had unintended consequences. Civil servants grew reluctant to approve projects or make procurement decisions, fearing legal repercussions if something went wrong. This created a de facto paralysis in parts of the bureaucracy.

External pressures mount

Le Hong Hiep, a senior fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, told DW that although the reforms were introduced before the threat of US « reciprocal tariffs » emerged, they now carry extra weight and urgency due to this. A 46% tariff on some Vietnamese goods was suspended until July, but remains on the table.

Washington has accused Vietnam of currency manipulation and trade circumvention. Vietnam’s trade surplus with the US has ballooned in recent years, from roughly $47 billion in 2019, when US President Donald Trump called Vietnam the « single worst abuser » on trade, to nearly $123 billion last year. Around a third of Vietnam’s exports are sold to the US, and the government has taken notable steps to soothe Washington’s concerns.

« Vietnam needs to strengthen political governance and economic resilience to better deal with external shocks and uncertainties, » said Hiep. « If executed well, these changes will deliver exactly what Vietnam needs to thrive. »

At the same time, Hanoi is watching regional trends. Across Southeast Asia, governments are reconsidering the cost and scale of public administration. In January, Indonesia’s new president Prabowo Subianto announced $19 billion in cuts to the state budget — about 8.5% — with the Ministry of Public Works set to lose more than half of its funding. Laos has floated plans to merge ministries. Malaysia is conducting a cost-efficiency review of its public sector.

But Vietnam is going much further. Previous efforts to streamline the state, including a 2015 campaign, failed. In fact, the number of public employees rose by 96,000 between 2015 and 2017, despite pledges to reduce the payroll.

Hanoi insists that this time, things will be different. Analysts say the scope and detail of the reforms suggest serious intent and political calculation.

To Lam’s power play

Vietnam’s administrative overhaul is taking place ahead of the Communist Party’s 14th National Congress in January 2026. Held every five years, the congress determines the country’s top leadership and strategic direction.

To Lam, widely seen as the main contender for reappointment as general secretary, stands to benefit significantly from the restructuring. By eliminating 29 provinces and all district-level party branches, the central government is removing layers of political negotiation and bargaining. It also narrows the pathway to power for rising party officials.

« A 46% reduction in provincial party chiefs gives To Lam incredible power — he can choose loyalists, » Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, told DW.

« Additionally, by eliminating nearly half of the provinces and all of the district-level units, the Communist Party is significantly reducing the pathways for advancement for its members, » he added.

This restructuring allows the top leadership to exert more direct control over local affairs and appointments. It also aligns with a broader ideological shift under To Lam, who has emphasized centralized governance and tighter discipline throughout the Party ranks as part of a drive to refocus the entire state on delivering economic security for the next few decades.

« If successful, the reforms could create a more efficient and accountable state machinery, strengthening internal checks within the system — fewer layers mean clearer responsibility delegation, » said Giang.

The Vietnamese state has long been a safety net for underqualified but politically-connected individuals, and vested interests may resist change. It remains to be seen how the changes will be implemented.

By David Hutt – Deutsche Welle – May 2, 2025