Vietnam’s nuclear power revival : ambition or overreach?

Vietnam’s renewed ambition of developing nuclear power plants to fuel its industrialisation drive – supported by strong elite consensus – faces several obstacles, including an unrealistic timeline and financial challenges.

After shelving its nuclear energy ambitions in 2016, Vietnam is now giving atomic power another chance.

The reversal stems from both desperation and ambition – the crippling blackouts of 2023 that shuttered factories, mounting pressure from Western partners to abandon coal, and a newly consolidated leadership eager to project technological prowess.

However, Vietnam needs to surmount several challenges to meet this renewed ambition.

Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s administration has swiftly moved from initial discussions last year to formally incorporate nuclear energy into its revised Power Development Plan 8 (PDP8) this April. The National Assembly quickly followed suit, and is expected to pass a new Atomic Energy Law to clear the regulatory pathway this June. The government now plans to develop two nuclear plants in Ninh Thuan province capable of generating up to 8,000 megawatts (MW) of power and costing as much as US$22 billion.

State-owned giants Vietnam Electricity (EVN) and PetroVietnam (PVN) will lead as primary investors. The government wants to kick off the project by the end of this year and achieve completion by December 2030.

Vietnam’s renewed nuclear energy push makes sense for several reasons. First, the country’s relentless industrialisation and the resulting soaring electricity demand have turned energy security into an urgent priority. The catastrophic June 2023 blackouts in northern Vietnam – which forced Samsung and Foxconn to suspend production and prompted Intel to back out of its expansion plans – damaged the country’s reputation as a stable manufacturing base. Nuclear power promises consistent, high-capacity generation that renewables alone cannot guarantee.

Second, nuclear energy aligns well with Vietnam’s climate commitments under the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26). To meet those ambitious net-zero emissions targets by 2050, Vietnam must significantly reduce its dependence on coal-fired plants, which currently dominate its energy landscape. Nuclear power provides a reliable, carbon-free baseload that complements intermittent wind and solar power.

Third, investing in nuclear energy could help upgrade Vietnam’s technological capabilities, positioning it as a player in the advanced, capital-intensive nuclear sector. Additionally, this ambition opens diplomatic avenues, allowing Vietnam to strategically distribute projects among different foreign powers and thus hedge against geopolitical pressures.

Indeed, international players are already competing vigorously for Vietnam’s nuclear power contracts. Russia’s Rosatom, the frontrunner prior to the 2016 suspension, has aggressively sought to reclaim its preferred status, already engaging Hanoi on credit terms for the Ninh Thuan 1 project.

During President Emmanuel Macron’s May 2025 visit, French energy giant EDF discussed potential cooperation. Concurrently, America’s Westinghouse leveraged recent United States-Vietnam trade negotiations in Washington to stake its claim. South Korea’s KEPCO and Japan’s Hitachi also seek a foothold, eyeing Vietnam as a gateway to other Southeast Asian markets.

However, substantial obstacles complicate Vietnam’s nuclear energy ambitions. Foremost is a critical shortage of nuclear specialists.

Following the 2016 halt, Vietnam discontinued university training programmes, prompting many Russian and Japanese-trained nuclear engineers to leave the field or emigrate. Rebuilding this expertise will be a lengthy and resource-intensive process, especially given the government’s ambitious goal to restart projects by the end of this year. Officials estimate that at least 2,400 skilled engineers and technicians are needed just for the initial Ninh Thuan plants. Additionally, regulatory frameworks, safety protocols, and waste management systems require substantial development from scratch.

Second, the government’s timeline of five years for completion is widely viewed as unrealistic.

Vietnam’s former Minister of Science and Technology Nguyen Quan believes it must take at least 15 years, and international precedents suggest even this is optimistic. Britain’s Hinkley Point C nuclear power project, which began in 2017 with far superior resources, will not see completion until 2031 – 14 years late and US$22 billion over budget. Finland’s Olkiluoto 3 took 17 years instead of four. Even China, with its advanced nuclear technology and limitless resources, averages seven years for completing a reactor.

Thus, accelerating a complex project such as a nuclear power plant risks compromising safety and quality, a significant concern given Vietnam’s mediocre record of handling radioactive materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously advised Vietnam to proceed cautiously, underscoring the need for thorough preparation before launching any nuclear energy initiatives. 

Third, financial feasibility remains uncertain. Committing US$22 billion – equivalent to about 5 per cent of Vietnam’s gross domestic product (GDP) – poses significant fiscal challenges. Other substantial infrastructure projects, notably the US$67 billion North–South High-speed Rail, compete for limited public funds.

Moreover, historical cost overruns and inefficiencies in state-managed megaprojects amplify these financial risks. Since EVN and PVN are state-owned enterprises, financial responsibility – and thus risk – falls squarely upon government shoulders, exacerbating concerns about public debt.

Despite these considerable challenges, momentum behind Vietnam’s nuclear energy revival appears unstoppable. Energy security, climate obligations, and the pressing need to move beyond coal create powerful incentives. The absence of significant resistance suggests there is elite consensus that nuclear power has moved from optional luxury to strategic necessity for Vietnam.

Furthermore, unlike 2016, when fiscal prudence and lingering anxieties from Japan’s Fukushima disaster drove the National Assembly to halt former PM Nguyen Tan Dung’s nuclear initiatives, today’s political climate offers little room for dissent. With the political system increasingly centralised under PM Pham Minh Chinh and particularly general secretary To Lam, the National Assembly has fewer opportunities and less incentive to challenge major executive decisions. The amended Atomic Energy Law will likely grant the PM the sole authority to approve nuclear projects, a power previously reserved for the legislative branch. 

The months ahead will be critical. Legislative approval, selection of international partners, and initial site preparation will demonstrate whether Vietnam’s nuclear energy projects are truly viable.

For Hanoi, which is striving to escape the middle-income trap and navigate complex geopolitical dynamics, the stakes are high. Nuclear power promises cleaner, abundant, and sovereign energy to boost its economic growth in the era of uncertainty. Yet, whether Vietnam can become the first Southeast Asian country with an active nuclear power plant is, quite literally, a US$22 billion question.

By Nguyen Khac Giang  –  ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute / Fulcrum.sg – June 26, 2025