Indonesia, Vietnam, and the BRICS Question

Both Jakarta and Hanoi seek to preserve strategic autonomy while navigating an increasingly polarized international environment. BRICS may offer a third path.

The resurgence of great power competition is testing Southeast Asia’s long-standing tradition of non-alignment. For Indonesia and Vietnam, two countries that have historically maintained equidistance from rival powers, the emerging global reordering is generating new pressures and opportunities. The re-election of Donald Trump and a reinvigorated U.S. sanctions regime have added volatility to the Indo-Pacific landscape. At the same time, the expanded role of BRICS is inviting recalibrations from regional middle powers seeking alternatives to Western-led structures.

In June 2025, Vietnam was granted BRICS partner-country status, joining Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in deepening ties with the bloc. Meanwhile, Indonesia was formally admitted as a full member in January, signaling Jakarta’s ambition to elevate its voice in global governance. These moves raise a critical question: can middle powers like Vietnam and Indonesia maintain strategic flexibility while aligning more visibly with emerging coalitions?

Non-Alignment Under Pressure

Vietnam and Indonesia share a legacy of non-aligned foreign policy, shaped by post-colonial struggles and skepticism toward great power entanglements. But today, strategic ambiguity is becoming harder to sustain. Both countries are navigating a geopolitical terrain defined by techno-economic rivalry, sanctions regimes, and competitive infrastructure financing.

Trump’s second term has brought a renewed push to decouple global supply chains from China. In this effort, Southeast Asia has become both a prize and a pressure point. Vietnam, in particular, is feeling the squeeze. U.S. trade negotiators have demanded a significant reduction in Vietnamese reliance on Chinese industrial inputs, which is a tall order for an export-driven economy that is deeply integrated with China.

Most recently, Trump announced sweeping trade measures: a 20 percent tariff on all Vietnamese exports to the U.S., along with a 40 percent tariff on transshipments originating from third countries. Although the details remain unclear, analysts believe the policy is targeting Chinese-origin components, which form the backbone of Vietnam’s manufacturing sector.

Status-Seeking in Jakarta

For Indonesia, these shifting dynamics have coincided with a change in leadership. President Prabowo Subianto has embraced a more assertive foreign policy, characterized by high-profile diplomatic visits, symbolic gestures, and what some observers view as status-seeking behavior. His unusually warm congratulatory call to Trump in 2024, seen by many Indonesians as overly deferential, raised eyebrows in Jakarta. Trump’s muted response only deepened domestic skepticism about the wisdom of appearing too eager to court Washington.

Prabowo’s subsequent visit to Moscow added further complexity. With Russia still under sweeping Western sanctions, the move signaled Jakarta’s intent to hedge rather than align. Critics argue that these maneuvers reflect ambition more than leverage. Still, Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS as a full member indicates a deliberate effort to enhance its global profile without committing to binary alignments.

Vietnam’s Strategic Calculus

Vietnam is also engaging BRICS with calculated intent. At the July summit in Rio de Janeiro, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh called for greater cooperation among Global South nations in health, digital infrastructure, and climate adaptation. He also emphasized the need for inclusive, human-centered AI governance, reflecting Vietnam’s ambitions in the digital economy and its growing discomfort with technological dependence on both China and the West.

Unlike Indonesia, Vietnam opted for partner status within BRICS rather than full membership. This likely reflects Hanoi’s desire to preserve its strategic balance. Deep economic ties with China are countered by growing security and trade partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and India. The term “bamboo diplomacy” remains central to Vietnam’s foreign policy, symbolizing flexibility and resilience.

However, Vietnam’s options are increasingly constrained by external shocks. Trade barriers, technological bifurcation, and diverging regulatory standards make hedging more difficult. By engaging BRICS, Vietnam signals its support for a multipolar order that does not require choosing between Washington and Beijing.

BRICS and the New Middle Power Toolkit

Both Indonesia and Vietnam are approaching BRICS not as an ideological bloc but as a platform to amplify their voices as middle powers. For Jakarta, full membership is a milestone in its long-standing ambition to play a more influential role globally without becoming entangled in great power rivalries. Indonesian foreign policy has long operated under the maxim, “a thousand friends are too few, one enemy is too many.” BRICS, in this sense, provides a pragmatic venue for pursuing multilateral reform, especially in institutions perceived to favor the Global North.

According to Indonesian diplomat Pandu Utama Manggala, Jakarta’s accession to BRICS reflects a strategic effort to shape global governance, particularly in areas like financial institutions and digital infrastructure. Under Brazil’s 2025 presidency, the bloc has outlined six priorities: trade, climate leadership, health, AI governance, peace and security reform, and institutional development. These priorities align closely with Indonesia’s global aspirations.

Vietnam’s approach is more cautious but equally strategic. As a partner country, it maintains policy flexibility while gaining access to infrastructure, investment, and climate cooperation under the BRICS umbrella.

Tech, Trade, and the Path Forward

Vietnam’s engagement with BRICS also aligns with its digital and green growth strategy. In 2024, electric vehicle (EV) sales in Vietnam surged, accounting for 22 percent of new car purchases. Domestic manufacturer VinFast sold over 87,000 units, supported by government incentives and growing local demand. With new trade routes emerging through BRICS channels to South America, the EV sector could become a core pillar of Vietnam’s economic future.

For both countries, BRICS offers more than prestige. It provides access to investment and cooperation in key sectors such as cybersecurity, digital governance, and artificial intelligence. If BRICS can move beyond rhetoric and deliver concrete outcomes, it could become a transformative force for Global South economies.

Indonesia and Vietnam are at a crossroads. Both seek to preserve strategic autonomy while navigating an increasingly polarized international environment. BRICS may offer a third path, providing a platform for cooperation without strict alignment and influence without ideological conformity.

As economic fragmentation deepens and global governance grows more contested, the choices made in Jakarta and Hanoi will resonate across the Indo-Pacific. If BRICS becomes a vehicle for a genuine middle power agency, it may help shape a new and more inclusive model of international engagement.

By Isti Marta Sukma – The Diplomat – July 11, 2025