The fallacy of Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy

Vietnam is prioritising appeasement of the powers that matter – Beijing and Washington – while neglecting its own long-term vulnerabilities.

Vietnam’s tensile nonalignment is unsustainable.

Even after a widely vaunted trade deal with the United States this month, the sharp contradictions that mire Vietnamese foreign policy remain.

Many view Vietnam’s rapid economic development and growing diplomatic engagements with the United States as a sign of its rising status. Yet, contradictory attempts to appease both Washington and Beijing belie Hanoi’s outdated foreign policy – intent on political posturing while China continues its aggressive expansion in the South China Sea.

Worse yet, Vietnam’s economy is dependent on Chinese imports while reliant on selling finished products to the US market – a vulnerability exacerbated by tensions surrounding US President Donald Trump’s 40% duties on Chinese goods shipped through Vietnam.

Hanoi’s emphasis on flexible multilateral engagement – dubbed “bamboo diplomacy” – bets on a world where trade trumps security. Though effective in calmer times, this leaves Vietnam defenceless in a period of tariffs, tensions and Trump.

Consider, even as Hanoi assuages Washington – and evades looming tariffs – by vowing to crack down on myriad US-bound Chinese products falsely labelled as Vietnamese, it pursues closer ties with Beijing.

Indeed, China’s President Xi Jinping visited Hanoi in April to issue a joint statement praising “more substantive defence–security cooperation” and “better controlled and resolved differences”, referencing the chronically stalled negotiations to ease roiling South China Sea tensions.

Vietnam is prioritising appeasement of the powers that matter – Beijing and Washington – while neglecting its own core long-term vulnerabilities.

These relationships weren’t always so amicable.

Trapped in a hostile neighbourhood, Hanoi had built strong connections with the Soviet Union, its sole sympathiser among the great powers, to create a solid foundation for Vietnamese security. Then, during its fierce fight against the United States in the Vietnam War, Hanoi’s close ties to Moscow aroused similar animosity in Beijing. At the height of the Sino-Soviet split, China deemed Vietnam an extension of Soviet influence. Relations only worsened after Vietnam invaded the Chinese-backed regime in Cambodia in 1978. China even attempted an unsuccessful invasion of Vietnam for about three weeks in 1979.

For decades after the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, Vietnam’s foreign policy demonstrated that the most flexible bamboo has sturdy roots. Through the uncertainty of US unipolarity and China’s rise, Vietnam relied on Russia’s patronage. The Kremlin maintained a steady flow of Soviet-era armaments, which came to a near halt early into the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, growing Sino-Russian ties, as well as Chinese advances into the South China Sea, cemented a concerning estrangement from Russia.

Vietnam now needs to look elsewhere for support against China’s provocations. Washington would seem the obvious choice. Yet, outright alignment would risk Beijing’s wrath – particularly since China readily threatens Vietnam with military action if it strays too far.

Pushing Washington away, however, could lead to a de facto capitulation of sovereignty in the South China Sea. Facing these two bad options, Hanoi must find a viable middle ground.

This dilemma demonstrates the fallacy of bamboo diplomacy.

Vietnam can declare a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Washington – without obtaining substantive security assistance that recaptures lost leverage.

Meanwhile, Hanoi commits itself to Sisyphean code of conduct negotiations with China, abetting Chinese maritime encroachment in exchange for reasonably stable relations.

It doesn’t help that Vietnam needs China’s raw materials imports while depending on the United States as the primary market for its booming exports. The Vietnamese economic model is built on the assumption that trade and diplomatic engagement can stave off Chinese coercion.

Yet, the balance of power slowly tilts against Vietnam. Chinese leverage grows daily in the South China Sea, manifest in its artificial islands in Vietnamese waters. As the military situation with China worsens, any incentives for cooperating with the United States – or alternative friendly powers, like India or the Philippines – diminish. Bamboo diplomacy has devolved into complacency.

In some sense, however, this remains sensible policymaking for Hanoi. If China can’t be stopped, it might be stalled, giving Vietnam time to develop a stronger economic base – a dangerous assumption to say the least. Even as the international situation deteriorates, it won’t expose Hanoi to immediate risk. The contradiction is apparent, but it’s far easier to carry on, turn a blind eye and prolong peace for now.

Unfortunately, this peace may prove hollow. With Washington fixated elsewhere, China may be emboldened to strike deeper into Vietnamese waters and threaten vulnerable shipping bound for the US market – a grave threat to American and Vietnamese interests alike.

Vietnam’s impressive strides toward prosperity aren’t the product of shrewd diplomacy as much as the unassuming remnants of a withering foreign policy. Bamboo gets weaker as it ages – the roots become shallow and the stalk brittle.

Time will tell if rising winds sweep it away.

By Jackson Lopez – The Interpreter / The Lowy Institute – 17 juillet 2025