Will Vietnam go down China’s path ?

Vietnam’s new general secretary To Lam is likely to consolidate power, as per Xi Jinping in China. But his economic and foreign policy approach may be different.

On 3 August 2024, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) unanimously elected President To Lam as the Party’s new general secretary, marking a significant turning point in Vietnamese politics. This momentous leadership change has sparked widespread speculation about the future of the country’s political landscape. Some Vietnam observers have raised the question of whether Lam, a police general and former minister of public security, will adopt authoritarian tendencies and steer the country towards a path similar to that of China under President Xi Jinping.

To fully address this question, it is crucial to gain an understanding of Lam’s political trajectory in the coming years, particularly in the lead-up to the CPV’s 14th National Congress in 2026. This will provide insights into whether his political approach aligns with that of President Xi. Additionally, his economic and foreign policy agendas will serve as a key indicator of Vietnam’s direction under his leadership.

There is a strong possibility that Lam, who will turn 69 in 2026, will continue to stay in power after the CPV’s 14th Congress, despite the age limit. Currently, he holds both the positions of state president and CPV general secretary. There have been rumours that Luong Cuong, an army general and standing member of the CPV Secretariat, will take over the presidency from Lam. However, this has not been officially confirmed, leaving uncertainty around whether and when this might occur. Vietnam’s traditional “four pillar” power structure acts as an internal system of checks and balances among the country’s top four leadership positions: CPV general secretary, state president, prime minister, and National Assembly chair. This prevents excessive concentration of power in one individual. If Lam is able to retain both positions, especially after 2026, this could be a cause for concern for Vietnam.

Another open question is whether Lam will eliminate potential rivals and their associates, replacing them with his own loyal supporters in key positions within the Party and government. This is a common tactic used by President Xi to solidify his power. In his first statements as Party chief, Lam declared his commitment to continuing the anti-corruption campaign, which is a major legacy of his predecessor, Nguyen Phu Trong. This campaign not only provides Lam with much-needed political legitimacy, but also serves as a tool to remove any potential challengers and insert his trusted allies into vacant positions. This strategy has already been implemented, as seen with the appointments of Luong Tam Quang and Nguyen Duy Ngoc, known as Lam’s allies within the Ministry of Public Security. Quang has been elevated to become minister of public security and Ngoc the head of the CPV central office. Another police general, Vu Hong Van, has also been recently appointed as deputy head of the powerful Central Inspection Commission of the Party. Notably, all three generals hail from Lam’s home province of Hung Yen. It is highly likely that this trend will continue until at least 2026, with more key positions being awarded to Lam’s allies and proteges.

… while Lam may tighten Vietnam’s political environment and restrict civic space through consolidating his power and appointing allies to key positions, this does not necessarily mean negative changes in the country’s economic and foreign policies.

The above analysis suggests that if Lam successfully consolidates power in a similar fashion to Xi Jinping in China, political infighting in Vietnam may decrease and the country’s political system could potentially become more stable in the short term, with less frequent leadership changes at the highest level. However, the downside is that Vietnam’s political climate may become more authoritarian and the CPV’s intra-party democracy may suffer. This could also lead to tighter restrictions on civic space under the new leadership. Ultimately, this could create the potential for political instability in the long run, particularly when Lam retires and a power vacuum emerges.

However, there is little reason to believe that Lam will follow Xi Jinping’s footsteps when it comes to economic and foreign affairs. Currently, the country’s economy is thriving and there is no incentive for Lam to disrupt it. On the contrary, he may aim to further boost the economy in order to strengthen his political legitimacy and justify his leadership. Having spent his whole career in the security sector, Lam lacks experience in economic governance and is unlikely to heavily intervene in that area. He may therefore focus on party affairs and delegate economic matters to the prime minister. Additionally, known as a pragmatist rather than an ideologue, he is unlikely to pursue ideological agendas like President Xi, such as promoting “common prosperity” or cracking down on private entrepreneurs. In fact, Lam has personal ties to private business, with his younger brother being a prominent businessman in the motorbike distribution, real estate, and energy sectors. This may encourage him to be open to economic reforms and friendly to investors.

Similarly, Vietnam’s foreign policy is not expected to be significantly influenced by Lam’s rise to power. He is likely to continue Trong’s “bamboo diplomacy” approach. With his background in security, he may be comfortable working with authoritarian leaders like President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. However, this does not mean that Vietnam will neglect its ties with Western partners. In fact, during a meeting with US ambassador to Vietnam Marc Knapper in June, Lam emphasised the importance of close cooperation between the two countries in implementing their newly established Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In other words, under his leadership, Vietnam will continue to balance its relationships with the major powers, particularly China and the US, and pursue friendly ties with all important global actors. This approach is currently the best foreign policy option for Vietnam, regardless of who is at the helm of the CPV.

In sum, while Lam may tighten Vietnam’s political environment and restrict civic space through consolidating his power and appointing allies to key positions, this does not necessarily mean negative changes in the country’s economic and foreign policies. Regarding his ability to consolidate power, a key issue to watch for now is whether and when Lam will relinquish his position as state president.

By Le Hong Hiep – Fulcrum.sg / Yusof Ishak Institute – August 19, 2024