How Vietnam’s non-aligned foreign policy helps bolster its position in the South China Sea

Hanoi’s expansion of its outposts in the Spratly Islands has prompted little opposition from rival claimants, including China.

Vietnam is asserting its maritime sovereignty in the South China Sea on an unprecedented scale. In August, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) reported that the country had created approximately 70 percent (3,319 acres) as much artificial land in the Spratly Islands as China (4,650 acres). AMTI also projected that Hanoi’s reclamation activities would soon match and likely surpass China’s own island-building efforts. Vietnam only began its massive island reclamation campaign in 2021, and these activities focused mostly on building new harbors and runways. These stepped-up reclamation efforts came after Hanoi undertook a massive naval modernization program in the 2000s and 2010s, with the purchase of six Russian Kilo-class submarines, four Gepard-3.9 frigates, and 36 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 multirole aircraft.

Vietnam now wants to complement an upgrade in military hardware with an upgrade in maritime facilities to increase the patrolling capabilities of its naval assets. Instead of having to travel back to the mainland to refuel and resupply, ships and fighters can patrol a larger swath of the sea from the islands. Vietnam can also address the logistical problem with its runways. Cargo planes can transport necessities from the mainland in a few hours instead of a few days in the case of cargo ships. In short, a modernized navy without upgraded islands cannot fully fulfill its law enforcement and defense duties; conversely, upgraded islands without a modernized navy would be isolated from the mainland.

The intention behind Vietnam’s island reclamation activities is clear: it wants to maintain and boost its maritime presence at the same time as other claimants are doing. However, what is remarkable about Vietnam’s reclamation activities is that no rival claimants have voiced their strong opposition or undertaken physical actions to stop these activities. For instance, China, in contrast to its aggressive treatment of the Philippines, has not forcefully opposed Vietnam’s behavior by interdicting Vietnam’s supplies to its outposts. It has only voiced some concern and even then, has not even called out Vietnam by name. In general, China and Vietnam have agreed to cooperate to settle the South China Sea disputes by taking “no action that can complicate the situation or extend disputes.”

But it is not just China. Even countries like the United States and the Philippines have turned an apparent blind eye to Vietnam’s actions. When China was expanding its own islands in the 2010s, the U.S. continuously voiced its concerns about how Chinese actions could undermine regional stability. In response, Washington augmented its defense relations with Japan and the Philippines. The U.S. government has not made any comments condemning Hanoi’s behavior in the South China Sea since 2021. Instead, Washington even supported Vietnam’s naval modernization by transferring a third cutter to Vietnam to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the normalization of relations earlier this year. In their statements, Vietnamese and U.S. leaders have emphasized Vietnam’s contributions to regional peace and supported a stronger maritime capacity for Vietnam as Hanoi accelerated its reclamation campaign.

The Philippines has also remained silent about Vietnam’s activities. Like its U.S. ally, the Philippines has always condemned Chinese island-building activities. However, Manila is open to boosting maritime cooperation with Hanoi. Last year, when Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visited Hanoi, the two countries agreed to strengthen their strategic partnership via stronger exchanges between their coastguards. They also pledged to collaborate to prevent and manage incidents in disputed waters. Other ASEAN countries have also failed to condemn Hanoi’s reclamation activities. Instead, Vietnam signed a sea boundary agreement with Indonesia in 2022, which was ratified in 2025. Other Spratlys claimants, such as Brunei or Malaysia, have similarly continued to foster maritime cooperation with Vietnam. Vietnam elevated ties with Malaysia to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year. Even Taiwan did not condemn Vietnam’s reclamation, and Taiwanese investments in Vietnam’s high-tech industry quadrupled to $2.2 billion in 2023 compared to 2022.

Vietnam’s success in muting international reactions to its island-building activities has much to do with its non-aligned foreign policy, in which it pledges no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign military bases, no using Vietnamese territory to oppose other countries, and no using force or threatening to use force in international relations. By renouncing the use of force, Hanoi has convincingly assured its neighbors and the U.S. that its expanded islands will not serve as a springboard for future takeover of islands under other claimants’ control. Vietnam’s behaviors, regardless of how much land Hanoi has created, are thus perceived to be defensive in nature. By the same logic, Vietnam’s naval modernization is generally seen to be defensive rather than offensive, as in China’s case. The U.S. and Philippines have condemned China’s behavior in the South China Sea because they are afraid that China would attack and occupy other outposts, as was the case with the seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, or impede international flows of trade.

More importantly, both China and the U.S. are convinced that Hanoi would not let any major power use Hanoi’s reclaimed islands to project their influence, due to Hanoi’s long-standing policy of not hosting foreign bases on Vietnamese soil. China has condemned the Philippines’ efforts to supply its outposts because it is concerned about the U.S.-Philippines alliance and the prospect that the U.S. could exploit the disputes between Beijing and Manila to destabilize China’s “backyard.”

Vietnam is free from Chinese coercion because its newly expanded islands would not be used by the U.S. to hurt China. Hypothetically, if Vietnam were to ally with China, the U.S. and the Philippines would likely condemn Hanoi out of a concern that Hanoi would let Beijing use its islands to attack those under Manila’s or others’ control. To further entrench its non-alignment, Hanoi has embedded its island-building activities within multilateral mechanisms. Vietnam has always emphasized that it supports ASEAN’s stance on the South China Sea and actively participated in negotiations for a Code of Conduct in accordance with the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The lack of opposition to Vietnam’s island-building activities confirms that the best way for Vietnam to protect its maritime claims is not to ally with any powers, regardless of how aggressive China will become. China and the U.S., as well as the Philippines and other Southeast Asian claimants, see no need to oppose Vietnam’s actions because Hanoi has successfully convinced them that they have an interest in not opposing them. For China, not opposing Vietnam’s island-building activities reinforces Hanoi’s neutrality. For others, turning a blind eye to Hanoi’s behaviors helps strengthen what they perceive to be a bulwark against Chinese maritime expansion. The strength of Vietnam’s non-aligned foreign policy is its ability to turn a zero-sum game among its neighbors into a positive-sum game for Vietnam. Whether Vietnam can reclaim more land than China and other claimants in the future depends on the continued success of its non-aligned foreign policy.

By Khang Vu – The Diplomat – October 07, 2025