Will Vietnam consolidate its top two leadership positions ?
Vietnam’s uppermost echelon of political leadership is likely to remain structurally unchanged for various reasons.
ith the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) just two months away, speculation is mounting over the configuration of the country’s top leadership, which will be finalised at the quinquennial event. By tradition, these decisions are typically sealed in the days before the congress opens (on 19 January 2026). A pertinent question for now, however, is whether the two paramount roles — that of the CPV general secretary and state president — will be consolidated. This issue’s resolution will be essential for understanding Vietnam’s evolving power dynamics and forecasting the key personnel outcomes of the Congress.
Since assuming power in August 2024, General Secretary To Lam has consolidated substantial authority across domestic and foreign policy arenas. At home, he has swiftly enacted sweeping political and administrative reforms with minimal pushback. He has also strategically positioned loyal allies in key posts, most recently appointing Tran Luu Quang as Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee and Nguyen Duy Ngoc as Secretary of the Hanoi Party Committee. Vietnam’s two most important political and economic hubs now fall under the leadership of To Lam’s closest allies. This underscores his growing dominance and may encourage him to pursue further power consolidation.
In foreign affairs, To Lam has wielded considerable influence through a flurry of high-profile visits blending international representation, economic diplomacy, and strategic guidance in his foreign engagements. By personally leading these engagements, he positions himself as Vietnam’s de facto global face, projecting the image of a pragmatic, decisive leader actively shaping the nation’s international posture and agenda. During such visits, Hanoi has consistently pushed for host nations to accord him head-of-state protocol, reflecting his dual role aspirations. Yet, partners have often demurred. During his October 2025 trip to the UK, for example, Lam was welcomed merely as a “Guest of Government”.
In this context, a pertinent question emerges: Will To Lam seek re-election as CPV general secretary while also claiming the presidency at the upcoming Congress? A close review of recent political signals strongly suggests this power consolidation is highly improbable.
… despite any ambitions To Lam may harbour, Vietnam’s top-tier power structure is likely to endure.
First, in early September, the CPV Politburo issued updated regulations regarding the list of leadership positions in the political system. The five key leadership positions of the party and state include that of the CPV general secretary, state president, prime minister, chair of the National Assembly, and the standing member of the CPV Secretariat. Compared to previous regulations, the position of standing member of the Secretariat has been elevated from the senior leadership group to the key leadership group, thereby changing Vietnam’s top leadership structure from “four pillars” to “five pillars”.
The issuance of this regulation just before the 14th Congress suggests that the current key leadership structure is likely to be maintained, making the consolidation of the CPV general secretary and state president positions less likely.
Second, the presidency is currently held by General Luong Cuong, a senior military figure. His appointment in October 2024, just two months after To Lam assumed the general secretary role, reflects a delicate power-sharing pact between the public security faction (led by Lam) and the military faction (led by Cuong). This arrangement preserves an equilibrium between Vietnam’s two most powerful camps. Any attempt by To Lam to claim the presidency at the forthcoming Congress would disrupt this balance, likely provoking strong military pushback. Moreover, consolidating the roles would alienate civilian politicians, as such a move would diminish their prospects for promotion due to the fewer leadership positions available.
Third, functionally, combining the CPV general secretary and state president roles would overburden a single leader, undermining party governance and state management. The dual workload spanning intense domestic duties and frequent international travel could pose health and performance risks. For example, last month, while To Lam toured Finland, Bulgaria, and the UK, President Luong Cuong represented Vietnam at the APEC Summit in South Korea. Such parallel commitments are routine. Separation of the two roles ensures operational continuity and leadership sustainability, making their consolidation impractical.
These three factors suggest that, despite any ambitions To Lam may harbour, Vietnam’s top-tier power structure is likely to endure. This aligns with past precedent, when the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong (2018–2021) and To Lam himself (2024) held dual roles only temporarily, due to specific circumstances. Vietnam’s “five pillars” will continue to be held by five distinct leaders. This framework is poised to endure, independent of any future general secretary’s influence.
This power structure differentiates Vietnam from other Communist countries like China, North Korea, and Laos, where the general secretary also serves as president. This structure may reduce the effectiveness of the high-level political system by making it more challenging to achieve political consensus. Moreover, it can create inconsistencies and inconveniences in Vietnam’s high-level diplomacy. For instance, the general secretary, despite being the most powerful politician in the domestic system, does not always receive the highest levels of reception (typically reserved for heads of state) during foreign visits.
On the positive side, this power structure helps to maintain a balance of power in Vietnam and preserves the system of collective leadership. This thereby avoids political instability or serious policy errors that might arise from an over-concentration of power. For the upcoming CPV Congress, this implies that the competition for top-level positions will be less intense than if To Lam were to attempt to control both the general secretary and president roles. If To Lam is re-elected as general secretary for another five-year term, it is highly likely that the presidency will remain with a representative from the military, potentially the incumbent President Luong Cuong or Minister of National Defence Phan Van Giang, should Cuong decide to retire.
By Le Hong Hiep – Yusof Ishak Institute / Fulcrum.sg – November 13, 2025