Vietnam faces a strategic crossroads in 2026
Vietnam is at a critical juncture in both its domestic politics and foreign relations. The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in late January 2026 will elect a new team to lead the government for the next five years. Meanwhile, Hanoi’s international strategy, known as ‘bamboo diplomacy’, is approaching breaking point as it risks trapping Vietnam in growing US–China rivalry.
Also at stake at the 14th National Congress is the fate of a ‘new era of development’. Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam has proclaimed that the 14th National Congress marks the start of this new era, aiming to turn Vietnam into a modern upper-middle-income country by 2030 and a developed, high-income socialist nation by 2045.
Under Lam’s leadership, the Politburo passed four resolutions between late 2024 and mid-2025, outlining a four-pillar strategy to achieve these development goals. The resolutions spanned diverse themes, including scientific and technological innovation, digital transformation and international integration. The resolutions further outlined a road map to align Vietnam’s legal framework with a new development era and emphasised the private sector’s role in driving Vietnam’s economic development.
Vietnam also carried out its most radical administrative and territorial reforms in decades. Between November 2024 and February 2025, numerous agencies in the party-state administration were either merged or abolished. By July 2025, the country’s 63 provincial-level territorial units were merged into 34. The number of communes was reduced from 10,035 to 3321 and all districts were abolished.
The policy directions laid out by the four-pillar strategy resonated with the reform-minded public. But the way that concrete policies were implemented has raised a lot of eyebrows. The massive territorial rearrangements were executed with little respect for organic structures and local identities.
Major economic and infrastructure development decisions have also been made without meaningful public consultation. These include decisions to build high-speed rail along the country’s coastline, to construct two nuclear power plants — projects initially awarded to Russia and Japan — and to aim for double-digit annual economic growth rates for the coming decades. While Russia jumped on this opportunity, Japan withdrew from the project, saying ‘the time frame is too tight’.
The ‘new era’ was enabled by an unprecedented change in Vietnam’s politics. Designed to save the communist regime, the anti-corruption campaign of the last decade failed to suppress rent-seeking behaviours. It instead empowered the security and police forces while dismantling checks and balances, allowing them to rise to a highly privileged position within the party-state.
In the run-up to the 14th National Congress, major elite groups coalesced around the military to balance the security and police forces’ bid for hegemony. But after a two-week delay, the 15th Central Committee Plenum, held over 22–23 December 2025, reportedly endorsed To Lam to stay in the top job for the next five years.
Whereas Vietnam’s domestic politics is dominated by a ‘game of thrones’, its foreign policy operates like ‘bamboo diplomacy’ on steroids. Since To Lam became General Secretary, Vietnam has elevated its ties with France, Malaysia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and the United Kingdom to comprehensive strategic partnerships. It has also upgraded relations with Brazil, Czechia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Finland, Bulgaria, Kuwait, Algeria and South Africa to strategic partnerships, and with Mongolia, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland and Egypt to comprehensive partnerships.
As of the end of 2025, Vietnam has 14 comprehensive strategic partnerships, 14 strategic partnerships and 14 comprehensive partnerships, including all major powers and with countries from every region. In just 16 months under Lam’s leadership, Vietnam doubled the number of its comprehensive strategic partners and added 12 more countries to its web of global partnerships.
A strategy of multi-alignment also informs Vietnam’s engagement with the United States and China. Responding to the Trump administration’s imposition of ‘reciprocal tariffs’, Hanoi was one of the first governments to contact Washington and offer negotiations. Vietnam pledged to ‘provide preferential market access for substantially all US industrial and agricultural exports to Vietnam’.
While moving closer to Washington, Hanoi has also strengthened ties with Beijing. Removing its long resistance on security grounds, Vietnam approved Chinese loans for a US$8.3 billion rail link in February 2025 and contracts for Chinese telecommunication firms Huawei and ZTE to supply 5G equipment in November 2025. Vietnam’s balancing act between the two superpowers is deepening the country’s dependence on — and vulnerabilities to — both the United States and China.
Two trends are worth watching in Vietnam over the next few years.
Internally, the security and police forces’ quest for dominance, the collapse of institutional checks and balances into a balance of power between the regime’s two armed forces and the rise of digital authoritarianism promise to tighten the party-state’s control over Vietnamese society. Externally, Vietnam risks being torn between the rivalling superpowers, rather than becoming a ‘swing state’ in US–China competition.
Two balances of power — one between the communist regime’s rivalling armed forces and the other between China and the United States — will shape Vietnam’s strategic trajectory in the years to come.
By Alexander L Vuving – Eastasiaforum.org – January 10, 2026