Vietnam’s 14th national congress : power, reform, and the next political generation
This month’s conclave could prove the most significant in a generation, determining whether Vietnam’s single-party system can evolve to meet contemporary demands.
The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)’s 14th National Congress opens on January 19, with roughly 1,600 delegates convening to formalize decisions already brokered in preceding months. This gathering may prove the most significant in a generation. Beyond determining who commands Vietnamese politics until 2031, the Congress will reveal whether the country’s single-party system can evolve to meet contemporary demands, or whether it will ossify under a security establishment that has never wielded greater influence.
General Secretary To Lam enters the Congress having accomplished something notable: roughly 18 months of political calm following the extraordinary instability that has swept away eight Politburo members since late 2022. The former public security chief engineered much of the anti-corruption drive that eliminated other key contenders before claiming the top position in August 2024, following the death of Nguyen Phu Trong. Yet he has also driven the most ambitious bureaucratic and economic reforms since Doi Moi in the late 1980s. He now seeks a full five-year mandate and, more boldly, structural changes that would define his political legacy.
One-Man Rule or Refined Collective Leadership ?
Rumors swirling after the CPV’s last plenum in late December suggest that To Lam will seek to permanently combine the roles of CPV general secretary and state president, aligning the Vietnamese system with fellow communist states China and Laos. Nguyen Phu Trong held both posts temporarily from 2018 to 2021, as did Lam himself briefly last year, but this marks the first time a permanent merger has been seriously discussed.
Such consolidation would offer certain advantages. It would formally legitimize party rule by making the CPV general secretary the head of state, eliminating diplomatic confusion and reducing complexity both domestically and internationally. The merger would also align with Lam’s “Streamlining Revolution,” as the president’s office and central party office would serve a single leader.
However, unification would come at the cost of Vietnam’s traditional division of authority across four senior positions: general secretary, president, prime minister, and National Assembly chair. This “four pillar” structure was designed to prevent the power concentration that plagued fraternal socialist states. Permanent unification would grant Vietnam’s leader unprecedented authority to drive change, though at the expense of institutional counterweights that have lent the system unexpected durability since the Doi Moi reforms. Historical experience also demonstrates that whenever the Vietnamese system has moved toward single-man rule – as during Le Duan’s post-war leadership – the economy and society have tended to suffer. Thus, maintaining robust collective leadership and accountability mechanisms within the CPV Politburo and Central Committee – two of Vietnam’s most important political institutions – remains crucial.
The party appears to be preparing for this scenario by elevating the permanent member of the Secretariat – the official overseeing the party’s routine operations – to the same tier as the four senior leaders. If the presidency merges with the general secretary position, the “four pillars” system would remain intact, with the permanent member of the Secretariat becoming one of those pillars. How effectively this change preserves balanced power-sharing at the top echelon remains to be seen.
Strongmen – and the Factions behind Them
The Politburo emerging from this Congress is set to look more like a security council than a technocratic boardroom. In the post-Doi Moi era, the military usually held one or two seats at the top table. The outgoing 2021–26 term broke that pattern, with three career military officers among 16 Politburo members – President Luong Cuong, Defense Minister Phan Van Giang, and Nguyen Trong Nghia, now the head of the army’s General Political Department – while another general, Trinh Van Quyet, sits in the Secretariat. The incoming term is expected to keep military representation elevated, at roughly three to four seats.
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS)’s rise has been even more striking. Six current Politburo members trace their careers to the MPS: General Secretary Lam, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, current Public Security Minister Luong Tam Quang, Hanoi party chief Nguyen Duy Ngoc, Internal Affairs Commission head Phan Dinh Trac, and Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Hoa Binh. Officials with MPS backgrounds are expected to retain three to four seats in the incoming Politburo.
Even if the final line-up shifts, the direction is clear: security and military figures are likely to make up close to half of a roughly 19-member Politburo, extending the securitization that accelerated during Trong’s third term after 2021.
That consolidation sits alongside a more complicated factional bargain than the usual “hardliners versus technocrats” shorthand suggests. The most potent network remains Lam’s own – rooted in the MPS and his home province of Hung Yen – reinforced by a web of allies who have moved into senior provincial and central posts. Close to it is a southern accommodation: figures linked to former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung are no longer treated as political outsiders. Dung’s son, Nguyen Thanh Nghi, a U.S.-educated engineer and former construction minister, now leads the Central Policy and Strategy Commission, a key advisory node that shapes the direction of national policy. Lam’s early overtures to the elder Dung signaled a deliberate effort to rebuild bridges with the southern faction, which is well-known for its reformist tendencies.
Against this sits a conservative bloc centered on the military and propaganda apparatuses, whose instinct is stability and ideological discipline. Phan Van Giang anchors that camp, alongside senior generals such as Nguyen Trong Nghia and Trinh Van Quyet; their influence helps explain the quiet frictions reported between security-led reformism and military-leaning conservatism.
There is also a third pole: the Nghe An–Ha Tinh corridor, a region with deep revolutionary credentials and enduring elite networks. The most prominent figure of this faction is Tran Cam Tu, the permanent member of the Secretariat, who will likely remain at the top echelon after the Congress. Tran Sy Thanh, born in 1971, now heads the Central Inspection Commission, giving the region a powerful hand on the party’s disciplinary lever. Le Minh Hung, another figure from the corridor who is Japan-trained, unusually fluent in monetary and financial policy for a senior cadre, and influential in personnel management, remains a leading contender for prime minister.
Nevertheless, this is not a succession fight between two camps so much as an attempt to stabilize rule through a crowded top. The advent of a younger cohort – Thanh, Nghi, Hung and others born in the 1970s – points to a generational renewal within the Party. There are also signs of a modest technocratic revival. Currently, only one Politburo member possesses genuine economic or technical credentials (Le Minh Hung). The incoming cohort is expected to include several capable technocrats: Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung (educated in the United States), Central Policy and Strategy Commission head Nguyen Thanh Nghi (also U.S.-trained), Deputy PM Le Thanh Long (Japan-educated), and Ho Chi Minh City party chief Tran Luu Quang. Their presence would provide the system with adequate technocratic competence even as it becomes more securitized.
Institutional Renovation Amid Contradiction
The past decade’s turmoil has compelled fundamental shifts in party governance. The anti-corruption campaign that consumed provincial leaders and ministers alike dismantled the norms and regulations that once rendered Vietnamese politics predictable. The most egregious breach was Nguyen Phu Trong’s extraordinary re-election to a third term as general secretary in 2021, which broke with the Party’s own constitution.
The upcoming National Congress is therefore significant for how the system evolves. It can descend into greater uncertainty through power politics, or revert to more predictable institutionalized mechanisms. Since assuming party leadership in August 2024, Lam appears keen on pursuing the latter course.
First, the remarkable “Streamlining Revolution” has greatly reshaped Vietnam’s landscape, not just administratively but politically. The reforms reduced the number of Vietnam’s provinces from 63 to 34 and cut 30 percent of key party commissions and government ministries, making the system leaner and easier to coordinate.
The CPV has also seized this opportunity to undertake sweeping personnel rotation. By Congress time, every provincial party secretary will serve outside their native province – a complete break from entrenched patterns where local officials dominated home territories through dense webs of family, school, and business connections.
Second, the CPV has introduced an ambitious program of institutional rebuilding. Regulation 366, which spans over 100 pages, creates a scoring system for assessing senior leaders – the first methodical effort to govern the party’s upper ranks through explicit standards rather than informal bargaining.
Third, while discussions about merging the general secretary position and presidency continue, the CPV under Lam has been hesitant to “streamline” the two most important institutions – the Politburo and Central Committee – with both maintaining their traditional membership numbers despite the broader restructuring. This preserves two anchors of Vietnam’s intra-elite bargaining and helps keep collective leadership intact.
Fourth, the CPV has expanded the core leadership to a “five pillars” system. Arguably, this arrangement might serve as a transitional step toward a “four-pillar” structure if the general secretary and presidency merge. Nevertheless, a larger core is harder for any single figure to dominate, and any strongman-type leader would prefer to avoid that constraint if possible.
Economic Ambitions and Constraints
The draft Political Report circulating before the Congress maintains ambitious economic goals while subtly adjusting emphasis. Vietnam targets average annual GDP expansion of at least 10 percent for 2026–2030, with per capita income targeted to reach approximately $8,500 by 2030 – a substantial increase from the unmet 6.5 to 7 percent objective for 2021–2025. The National Assembly has already endorsed 10 percent growth for 2026, underscoring the determination of the Party’s leadership to accelerate the country’s economic advancement.
Yet official messaging has quietly evolved. Where previous Congresses stressed “creativity,” the new emphasis is on the concept of “breakthrough”: a resolution to comprehensively restructure institutions, society, and the economy. The private sector is designated the “driving force” of development while the state retains its “leading role.” This formula obscures the unresolved tensions between market dynamism and party authority.
More revealing is what the rhetoric does not mention. Recent government statements have discreetly returned to macroeconomic stability as the governing priority, acknowledging that aggressive growth targets cannot come at the price of financial prudence. Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s effort to eliminate credit ceilings for banks drew warnings from rating agencies and even the central bank governor. Credit expansion hit 19 percent in 2025 – the fastest pace in a decade – in a banking system where credit already exceeds 140 percent of GDP. Memories of Vietnam’s 2007–2011 financial crisis, when uncontrolled lending drove inflation above 23 percent, remain fresh among policymakers who experienced that painful episode.
External Pressures and Diplomatic Balancing
The upcoming Congress convenes amid an unsettled international environment. Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in the United States brought steep tariffs that threatened Vietnam’s export-reliant economy, which directs nearly 30 percent of shipments to America. While last October’s “Framework for an Agreement” appears to have alleviated Hanoi’s immediate concerns, and exports reached another record high with a 14 percent year-on-year increase, the long-term vulnerability of this export-led model remains a pressing issue.
Events in Latin America have also brought new anxieties. The abduction of Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela will affect Hanoi psychologically, while any move against Cuba strikes particularly close to home; the nation occupies a “special” category for Vietnam, given decades of revolutionary solidarity.
These developments feed a basic worry that the United States can deepen ties with a communist state when it suits American interests, but can turn sharply if political winds shift in Washington. This creates doubt about America’s long-term intentions. It also shifts Vietnam’s internal debate, with reformists who favor closer Western ties losing some confidence while conservatives and security-minded officials gain ground. China’s narrative that the U.S. is unpredictable and prone to political interference will likely resonate in Hanoi.
On the other hand, the South China Sea and China’s regional ambitions remain Vietnam’s paramount security threat. Unable to depend entirely on either Washington or Beijing, To Lam has undertaken a remarkable 20 foreign trips in the past year to strengthen ties across the globe. The result: Vietnam now has 14 comprehensive strategic partnerships, compared with just six at the end of 2024.
The Political Report also reflects Vietnam’s growing confidence in conducting foreign policy “proactively,” emphasizing readiness to play a bigger role in regional affairs as a middle power. How effectively Hanoi can fulfill this aspiration remains to be seen, but ASEAN appears central to Vietnam’s foreign policy architecture.
What Comes Next
The genuine test lies not in proceedings inside the National Convention Center in Hanoi but in their aftermath. Can To Lam’s reforms build authentic consensus, or do they merely reflect his individual agenda? Personnel appointments will provide the clearest indication, and a sign of whether competing factions secured meaningful voice or found themselves sidelined. But the deeper question is whether To Lam’s reforms can serve both his consolidation of power and the system’s long-term stability. The two objectives are not necessarily incompatible: strongmen have sometimes built durable institutions precisely because doing so entrenched their authority.
The factional competition on display may itself prove stabilizing. A Politburo divided among security officials, military conservatives, and southern business interests is one where no single camp can dictate terms. This mutual dependence could restore something resembling collective leadership – or produce paralysis once the spotlight of the Congress fades.
To Lam’s institutional rebuilding at least gestures toward the system’s foundational principles. Whether it represents genuine renewal or a new framework for personal rule remains Vietnam’s weightiest political question – one that the 14th National Congress will open but likely not resolve.
By Nguyen Khac Giang – The Diplomat – January 15, 2026