Cooperation and struggle define Vietnam’s approach to China

Vietnam’s diplomatic approach emphasises a balance between ‘cooperation and struggle’ with Beijing. Despite concerns regarding a possible alignment shift, Hanoi remains focused on strengthening economic and political ties while resisting China’s encroachments in the South China Sea. 

This strategy includes military enhancements, close ties with regional powers and frequent political engagements. By deftly balancing relationships with great powers, Vietnam aims to safeguard its sovereignty and promote stability amid ongoing geopolitical challenges.

Given Vietnam’s diplomatic status and adept manoeuvring of great power relations, new developments regarding Hanoi’s alignment attract significant attention, including Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s August 2024 visit to China. Despite concerns over Hanoi’s potential alignment shift due to To Lam’s public security background and his role in Vietnam’s anti-corruption campaign, more time is needed to forecast major changes.

Any Vietnamese leader, regardless of their outlook, must find ways for Vietnam to co-exist peacefully with China while also resisting transgressions of Hanoi’s sovereignty and autonomy. In the language of the Vietnamese Communist Party, this approach is called ‘cooperation and struggle’ (vua hop tac vua dau tranh) and is employed in relations with China and other states. This paradigm implies that Vietnam firmly opposes any actions that threaten its interests and sovereignty while maintaining friendly relations in areas of shared interests.

Vietnam has crafted a nuanced approach that delicately balances resisting China’s encroachment in the South China Sea with maintaining cordial political relations and growing economic ties. Hanoi has established pockets of cooperation and struggle in each area — economic, political, security and defence — of bilateral ties with Beijing.

This approach is specifically tailored to Hanoi’s advantages and disadvantages in its dealings with Beijing. It capitalises on Vietnam’s geographical proximity and unique connections with China to foster growing economic interdependence and deep political ties. But this strategy also attempts to offset Vietnam’s lack of formal allies and direct threats posed by China through military modernisation and expanded defence cooperation with regional powers.

Hanoi continues to welcome trade and investment linkages from China — one of Vietnam’s leading trade partners and the main export destination for agricultural products, textiles and rubber. The US–China trade war has also led to a Chinese foreign direct investment boom in Vietnam.

This surge is spurred by US tariffs, geopolitical tensions, China’s rising labour costs, uncertainties in Xi Jinping’s economic governance and trade facilitating effects from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The quality of Chinese foreign direct investment in Vietnam has significantly improved, with the investment wave including big names in high-tech manufacturing, electric vehicles and the digital economy, like BYD, Alibaba and Chery.

Hanoi also maintains a close political relationship with China through frequent high-level visits. Preceding Lam’s trip, Xi Jinping visited Hanoi in December 2023, and the late general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited China in November 2022.

Another means to strengthen political ties is party-to-party channels. Both communist parties have a vested interest in maintaining their rule and are eager to share and learn from each other’s experiences through workshops, visits and seminars. These activities strengthen political connections as they are built on the power of shared affiliation to communist ideology and historical collaboration. Party-to-party channels have been employed to diffuse tensions in times of crisis — such as the 2014 oil rig confrontation.

Security and defence cooperation are two areas where Vietnam has demonstrated its resistance to China’s encroachment in the South China Sea. Hanoi has invested significantly in upgrading its navy and coast guards, even though arms procurements have stalled. Vietnam has also sought closer cooperation with the United States and other regional partners, focusing on joint exercises and capacity-building activities in maritime security. Significant progress in Southeast Asian maritime cooperation includes Vietnam’s coast guard drill with the Philippines in August 2024, along with an Exclusive Economic Zone agreement and naval exercises with Indonesia.

But Hanoi avoids putting all of its eggs in the China basket. Vietnam has courted AI and semiconductor investments from major US firms with the Biden administration’s blessing. Hanoi has upgraded multiple strategic partnerships, including a long-anticipated diplomatic upgrade with Washington. After his trip to Beijing, To Lam visited the United States, where he made an appearance at Columbia University. Vietnamese authorities also greenlit the New York Times’ plan to establish a new office in Ho Chi Minh City — another sign of Hanoi’s desire to deepen bilateral ties.

Hanoi has also carefully moderated its resistance in the South China Sea. Vietnam has refrained from publicising encroachments by Chinese coast guards, instead preferring a ‘shadowing and tracking’ strategy. Hanoi and Beijing also maintain relatively robust naval and coast guard cooperation with joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin, port visits and high-level exchanges.

Hanoi’s approach is built on a deep understanding of its current strengths and weaknesses in dealing with China. Change only happens when Hanoi sees a significant shift in the balance in its favour or when unexpected developments at the structural level force its hands. Maintaining the balance between cooperation and struggle requires significant diplomatic dexterity to avoid misperceptions. While major shifts brought by a new leader are not completely discounted, To Lam has only been in the position since July 2024. Only time will tell his legacy.

By Hanh Nguyen – EastAsiaForum.org – October 28, 2024