Vietnam’s new regime finds its footing

When Vietnam’s long-time leader Nguyen Phu Trong passed away on 19 July 2024, only the Minister of Public Security, Police General To Lam, was ready to act. 

All other politicians that may have once hoped to lead the all-powerful Communist Party of Vietnam in Trong’s stead instead chose retirement when they learned the contents of their dossiers that Lam’s subordinates had assembled.

A few days after Trong was laid to rest, the Party’s 200-member Central Committee assembled to acclaim Lam as his successor. Lam was not well known to the general public prior to his ascension to General Secretary. He made his career in the Ministry of Public Security, serving six years as deputy minister before taking the helm of the ministry in 2016. In this role, Trong’s determination to rid the Party of corruption burned ever more fiercely. To Lam’s contribution to Party anti-corruption efforts seems to have been invaluable.

But there was scepticism about whether the new General Secretary will be able to manage a much broader mandate. Many doubted the ability of a policeman to keep order in the ruling Party, run a sprawling government and steer a fast-growing economy.

By early November 2024, the question of Lam’s suitability had a very clear answer. With Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh as his principal aide, Lam intends nothing less than a root-and-branch renovation and rationalisation of Vietnam’s sprawling bureaucracy.

Periodically since the nation won its independence, its leaders have promised sweeping changes within a socialist framework. In the 1980s, they succeeded brilliantly with the Doi Moi reforms that did away with rationing and allowed the development of a market economy. In contrast, previous attempts at streamlining public sector institutions have accomplished very little.

Trong, for example, endorsed a program of administrative reform while wrangling with his nemesis, Nguyen Tan Dung — a former prime minister notoriously tolerant of corrupt activity by fellow officials. But Trong allowed that initiative to wither once he forced Nguyen Tan Dung out of office. Trong’s attention turned instead to punishing individual Party members who fell short of his standards for probity. This was Trong’s signature ‘fiery furnace’ campaign — it persisted until his death and reportedly weeded out some 17,000 corrupt or backsliding cadre.

Now as the Party leader, Lam has shifted the focus to institutional reforms. In contrast to Vietnam’s relatively efficient private sector enterprises, the public sector is strikingly overstaffed and inefficient. Resolution 18-NQ/TW, issued by the Party Central Committee in 2017, was intended to address bureaucratic bloat, but Trong had been far more interested in weeding out doctrinal backsliders.

During Trong’s leadership, ministries and Party offices did not put much effort into getting leaner and more efficient with the exception of the sprawling Ministry of Public Security, where Lam was deputy minister and then promoted to minister. As minister, Lam did not downsize the Ministry of Public Security so much as refocus and streamline it, eliminating many mid-level offices and staff, doubling the number of boots on the ground and, over the next several years, doubling the Ministry of Public Security’s strength again.

Statements by Lam and Prime Minister Chinh in the last few months of 2024 strongly suggest that — mindful that the Party’s 14th Congress will convene in January 2026 — they found it more efficient to resurrect Resolution 18-NQ/TW rather than spend months building a consensus on what reforms are needed and how soon.

The emerging plan would reduce and reorganise ministries and Party offices to eliminate functional overlaps. Authority to make and execute decisions is to be delegated to localities, subject only to after-the-fact reviews by higher levels. Underperforming cadre and officials — said to be about 20 per cent of the total — are to be ‘filtered out’.

In March 2025, every state agency is required to report its plans for restructuring and streamlining. By the end of the year, with a nod from the Politburo and the Cabinet Office, each should be putting its plans into effect.

If all these plans go as intended, the ‘new era’ that Lam often refers to could materialise, with the political system becoming noticeably ‘leaner, more compact, stronger, more efficient, effective and impactful’. When the 14th Congress convenes in January 2026, Lam and his team will reap the rewards by being accorded another five years to show what they can do.

By David Brown – EastAsiaForum.org – January 16, 2025